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ABSTRACT
The paper attempts to account for the differential growth performance of
the industrial countries and the middle income developing countries in the
1970s in terms of economic theory and some international cross-section
comparisons. The theory of adjustment to supply price shocks in an
individual country is coupled with the world equilibrium determination of
capital flows and interest rates. The supply shocks suffered by the
industrial countries during the first oil shock were compounded by
relative real wage rigidity and contractionary macro-economic response.
The middle-income countries, at least initially, showed greater real wage
flexibility and also followed a much more expansionary policy by borrowing
the equivalent of the large OPEC surplus at very low or negative real
interest rates. Their faster growth in output and productivity was
attained at higher current account deficits and more accelerated inflation.
At the time of the second oil shock this differential strategy could
no longer be pursued by many of the middle income countries as the real cost
of foreign borrowing as well as that of domestic labour increased
substantially.
Michael Bruno
TheMaurice Falk Institute for
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The limits to growth and structural change imposed by the ability to
borrow occupied much of the attention of the trade and development
literature in the great l960s development decade.1 A popular strand of
analysis was the two-gap approach to the current account and the associated
dual role of foreign borrowing. One aspect of foreign borrowing is the
financing of the ex ante gap between potential export proceeds and the
imports required as a major input into production. Alternatively it could
be looked upon as the foreign supplement to domestic savings in the finance
of long-term investment. In the one case the main role of foreign
borrowing is to smooth economic activity in the short-run; in the other
the emphasis is on accumulation and output growth in the medium and long
runs. In retrospect the actual input-output models within which these
trade-offs were measured may look somewhat rigid and simplistic but the
basic theoretical insight remains relevant and could be reformulated in
the language of a modern disequilibrium approach.
*Thispaper grew out of a project conducted at the National Bureaufor
Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass. and at the Falk Institute for
Economic Research in Jerusalem. Thanks go to the Ford Foundation and
to the National Science Foundation for financial support.I am indebted
to Jeffrey Sachs, Lance Taylor, and a referee for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.I am also grateful to Susanne Freund for editorial
assistance.
1 Some of the earlier studies and a recent restatement of the issues are
given in Chenery (1979).-2—
A closely related branch of the trade and developmentliterature
dealt with the extension of the static investment—savingsbalance into
an intertemporal, dynamic, view of thebalance of payments, raising the
question of optimal borrowing and resourceallocation over time. Oddly
enough, this model, which usually entailedfree capital mobility, was first
applied in a world of highly restricted capitalmarkets. Given the changed
world of capital mobility in the 1970s it is perhaps nowonder that the
intertemporal view of the balance of payments wastrediscoveredi by open-
economy macro-economists whose own concernhad for many years centred
exclusively on short-run balance-of-payments adjustment problemswith
overriding emphasis on imports and exports ratherthan on long-term
saving and investment. Some of these ideas willbe applied here to the
post-1973 world development scenario in which long-termstructural change
and short-term macro—economic response have become very closely
intertwined.I turn first to some aspects of the oil shock and the
recycling of petrodollars.
In the early days after the first oil price shock the main issue
discussed by economists and policy makers was the difficulty that might
be posed by the recycling of petrodollars. This involved at least one
basic misconception and one error of judgement. The misconception
concerned the view of the contraction and unemployment in the industrial
countries as a pure demand-insufficiency phenomenon. If only OPEC
recycled their oil proceeds quickly enough into the commoditymarkets of
the industrial countries (ICs), so the conventional Keynesian wisdomsaid,
normal economic activity and growth would be resumed. It took sometime
to be grasped that at least part of the contraction in the industrial
countries had to do with aggregate supply shifts due to a rise in input-3-
prices and that the oil and raw—material price increase could cause a
direct profit and productivity squeeze, which would be aggravated by a
failure of real wages to adjust downwards. Under such circumstances
excessive expansion of demand would accelerate inflation but would not
solve the unemployment problem.2 To that must be added the long-term
implications of the profit squeeze on capital accumulation and economic
growth.
If recycling is not primarily a commodity market problem--what is
it? Obviously it has a capital flow side to it, whose consequences turned
out to be somewhat different from what was thought at the time. This is
where the error of judgement comes in. It was thought that the world
would have great difficulty in intermediating the enormous flows of
petrodollars through the financial system from OPEC to the large oil
users. The ease with which the system intermediated between the
unprecedented surpluses and deficits in balances of payments was truly
remarkable. Moreover, no one at the time thought that the OPEC surplus
would by and large be confined to the financing of an increasing debt of
the middle-income countries (MICs), instead of financing the deficit of
the large oil-importing industrial countries. One of the interesting by-
products in the aftermath of the first oil price shock was the sharp fall
in real interest rates in the major financial markets, a phenomenon that
can be analysed in terms of shifts in world investment and savings
schedules.3
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Unemployment,however, was not entirely classical in nature. Both in
1975 and in 1981 a good part of it was conventional (partly self-imposed)
Keynesian unemployment.
For a lucid description of the main financial developments of the 1970s
in the wake of the oil shocks, see World Development Reports 2982,-4-
Themainobject of the present paper relates to an apparent puzzle.
How is it that the industrial countries performed so miserably after the
first oil shock while the middle-income oil importing countries seem to
have flourished? While GDP growth approximately halved it hardly fell
for the MICs. Although part of the increased expenditure went into public
consumption one of the most marked differences between the two groups of
countries is in the relative investment performance (to a considerable
degreefinanced by external debt in the MICs) ?Takingthe manufacturing
sector by itself, how does one explain the fact that the MICs accounted
forone quarter of the increase in manufacturing output of the world's
market economies between 1970 and 1978 (double the base level of 1970)?
As the last column of Table 1 shows, this is of the same order of magnitude
as the marginal share of the United States or of Japan and Germany combined
and more than that of all other OECD countries taken together, all of which
(with the exception of Japan) have reduced their average share in the total
during this period.
The present paper attempts to account for this differential performance
in terms of the theory of adjustment to supply price shocks in an individual
country and the world equilibrium determination of capital flows and
interest rates. It is argued that the supply shocks suffered by the
industrial countries were compounded by relative real wage rigidity and
contractionary macro-economic response, while the middle-income countries,
at least initially, showed greaterreal wage flexibility and also followed
Chapter 5. For a theoretical and empirical discussion of the
implications for investments, savings, and current accounts of countries
see Sachs (1981, 1982). Also relevant are the theoretical papers by
Marion and Svensson (1981), Schmid (1980), and Dixit (1981).
3aDetaileddata are given in Tables 3-5 below.- 5-
Table1. Shares in World Manufacturing Output--Market Economies:
1970 and 1978
a! . — Iraq,Kuwait, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, and
Source: Estimated on the basis of World












Low income countries 18.5 27.5 48.3 1.7 1.9 2.2
Middle income
countries 127.6229.3 79.7 12.0 15.6 25.1
Oil exporters 30,9 54.8 77.3 2.9 3.7 5.9
Oil importers 96.7 174.5 80.4 9.1 11.9 19.4
Industrial market
econcmies 914.2 1206.5 31.9 86.1 82.2 72.1
United States 331.5434.4 31.0 31.2 29.6 25.4
Germany and Japan 264.5 366.1 38.4 24.9 24.9 25.1
Other OECD 318.2406.0 27.6 30.0 27.7 21.6
Capital-sur3,us oil
exporters— 2.4 4.8 100.0 0.2 0.3 0.6
Total 1O62.7 1463.1 37.9 100.0 100.0100,0
the United Arab Emirates.
Development Report 1981,
percent on average) for
missing data on basis of 1979 relative population levels,
Table 1 (annex).-6
a much more expansionary policy by borrowing the equivalentof the large
OPEC surplus at very low or negative real interest rates. Faster growth
in output and productivity was attained at higher current account deficits
and more accelerated inflation.
Section I describes a fairly standard two-period model of tradable
goods production, with raw materials. Particularly relevant to the present
topic is the combined welfare effect of a rise in raw-material prices on
a net importer (exporter) of materials and the effect of a fall inthe
real interest rate on a net debtor (creditor). Section II extends the
model to a world with many countries, and states the general conditions
under which the world aggregate savings schedule would be upward sloping
and how a material (oil) price increase might shift it either way. The
possible reasons for the difference in real interest behaviour after the
two oil shocks are also discussed. Section III takes up the issue of
differential performance in terms of short-run real-wage flexibility and
the long-run response to the changing conditions in the capital market.
Section IV provides an international comparison of samples of OECD countries
and MICs. Comparative productivity, employment, and real wage data are
briefly analyzed. It is also shown that a clear trade-off existed between
the current account and the productivity performance, due to both long-
term investment finance and short-term demand smoothing. The middle-income
countries utilized this trade-off to their advantage in the period between
the two oil shocks. Towards the end of the l970s this differential
strategy could no longer be pursued as the real cost of borrowing as well
as that of labour increased substantially. Section V concludes with a few
open questions.-7-
I.PRODUCTION, INVESTMENT., AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Letus start off with a single-country, one-final-good, three-factor
framework which is the simplest model appropriate for the problem discussed
here. The country produces one tradable final good (of quantity Q and
price P) and uses a material (e.g., oil) input, N, whose relative
price (II =Pa/P)is given, in production, Q =Q(L,K, N), together
with labour, L, and capital, K. Linear homogeneity and factor corn-
plementarity (positive cross derivatives) are assumed. The final good
can be traded (net exports =X)and is used for domestic private (C)
and public (G) consumption as well as for investment,I, in future
capacity.
A common procedure, to be followed here, is to confine the discussion
to a two-period horizon. Superscripts denote the period (t =1,2).
Period 1, the short run, is characterized by the fact that the capital
stock is fixed (K =K).By period 2, the expected long run, the capital
stock may be augmented or contracted by the amount of investment or dis-
investment5 carried out in period 1(K2 =K+11).Zero depreciation and
no investment is assumed in period 2, since K2 stays on for posterity.
'Forrecent closely related work see Sachs (1981), Svensson (1981),
Razin (1980), and Bruno (l98lb).
Under a raw material price shock capital may have to be adjusted down-
wards. If one adds the realistic assumption of population growth or
independent labour-augmenting technical progress the interpretation is
that capital should be lower relative to its previous trend growth, not
necessarily that it should actually be reduced in absolute size.
Depreciation could also be introduced. These modifications are ignored
here only to keep the analysis to its essentials. Negative investment
should be interpreted in this light.-8-
Labour supply in both periods is assumed to be given and labour-augmenting
technical change is allowed for by measuring labour in intensity units
(Lt).
The commodity balance in the two periods takes the form
(1) Ct +Ct++ x Qt
where t =1,2 and, by assumption, 12 = 0.All these magnitudes are
measured in real output units.
While a single-sector specification for production of final goods is
maintained, the model is extended by introducing domestic production of
the raw material N.Its production will be assumed fixed at the quantity
Ut in both periods and will have the exogenous nominal market price Pt
(and relative price fl). Since the production of H is held fixed in
this country, the input of factors into it can be ignored and it is only
taken into account in the calculation of real income (yt) and the trade
balance (Ft). Total real income will be yt =Qt-litNt+]IHt
=Qt+
Tt(Ht
-Nt).It can be expressed as a value-added (or revenue) function:
(2) yt =yt(LtKt; fit Ut)
where ayt/aLt =Qt/LtYtIKt =Qt/aKt,yt111t =Ut-Nt,and
Yt/IIt =lit.n
Note that (Ht -Nt)is net exports of the material (negative for





Assume now that the country's residents are free to borrow or lend
between the two periods at a given interest factor R or (real) rate of
interest (R -1)(this particular 'small-economy' assumption will be
relaxed later). This implies the intertemporal borrowing or lending
constraint
(4) F1 +p2/R=O
Another way of stating this equation is to say, for the case of bor—
rowing, that the second periodts current account surplus, F2 +(R-
whichconsists of the trade surplus corrected for net interest payments,
must exactly match first period's deficit, -F'.
Using equation (3), the intertemporal borrowing constraint can
alternatively be stated as a household budget constraint,
(5) C' +C2/R=Y1+Y2/R—T-I'=
whereT =G'+G2/R=totalgovernment budget (taxes).
This again states the well-known property that the present value of
the consumption flow must equal the present value of the income stream
minus the change in physical wealth, which is net household wealth, .
Alternatively,if firm investment is financed by selling financial assets
to households (which must bear the same rate of interest, R -1),
equation (5) states that the total consumption flow of households plus
total incremental investment in the asset must equal total income accruing
to households.
Firm behaviour
Before returning to household behaviour let us digress for a moment to- 10-
considerthe firm's investment behaviour. It is assumed, along with much
of the optimum investment literature, that firms in the Q industry choose
i1 so as to maximize their discounted cash flow:
[Q'(K, L', N') -W'L'-llN']
-Ii+[(Q2(K+K1,L2, N2) -W2L2
llN2]/R
subject to the labour and production constraints.
Such intertemporal optimization leads to two kinds of conditions. One
is the usual set of static first-order conditions for the marginal products




Thesecond, intertemporal, condition comes from maximization with
respect to investment in the first period, i.e., choice of the capital
stock Kin the second period. This gives
(7) Q2/3K2 =R, I'L2K(Tl, R) -K,
where K is the capital-labour ratio at relative prices l[ and R.
What (7) implies is that while the marginal product of capital may
shift in the short run (fixed capital), in the long run (second period) the
capital stock must be adjusted6 so that its marginal product equals the
long-run external interest factor, R. With constant returns to scale the
product wage in period 2 (W2) is thus also determined exogenously. We
6 The present analysis amounts to assuming investment behaviour under
perfect foresight (or rational expectations), without having to introduce
costs of adjustment (or Tobin's q) explicitly, since the adjustment
takes place in one period.— 11—
shallmake considerable use of these simplifying properties.
Having stated the equilibriun conditions for firm behaviour, one can
now deduce some simple properties of the net wealth (2) concept intro-




=c1(ll, ri1, R,K, Ht, Lt; Ji)
For optimum investment (7) we have: Q =c(ll, fl2, R, K, Ht, Lt)
which is net wealth optimized with respect to investment. Differentiating
with respect to I, one gets Q/I' =[Y2/K2]/R-1=0.Therefore,
2 and 2* must have the same response to the exogenous variables.
The response of net wealth to changes in the price of the raw
material is





This is a simple and intuitively plausible result. It says that an
increase in the price of raw materials in either period increases or
decreases net wealth by the net export of the material input (H -N),
properly discounted. A net exporter gains in net wealth and a net
importer loses. The welfare implications of such changes and responses
to changes in R will be discussed later. Letus first turn toconsumption
and savings behaviour.
Householdconsumptionand savings behaviour
Suppose now that household behaviour can be represented as maximization,- 12—
bya representative household, of a concave intertemporal utility function
U(C', C2) subject to given net wealth, .Theconsumption goods of the
two periods are assumed to be gross substitutes (U,2 ? 0), implying that
both consumption goods are normal with respect to increases in wealth.
The consumption function is
(9) Ct =Ct(2,R)
As is well known from Fisherian theory, an increase in the rate of
interest will in general lead to ambiguous effects on present consumption
since the substitution and wealth effects of an interest-rate change work
in opposite directions. Only for a net borrower (or initial balance) can
we make unambiguous statements. This also applies to the present model.
Differentiating equation (5) and the first-order condition for utility




where A is the (positive) Hessian determinant of U and the related
first term in (10) is the pure compensated substitution effect. Thus
=-C'/R>0if F' ￿ 0.
Since investment is negatively related to the rate of interest it
follows that aF'/R =S1/R-I'/3R>0for F'0. Thus a net
borrower will borrow more (less) when the interest rate falls (rises).
Welfare analysis
One can summarize the effects of changes in relative prices by looking at
the components of welfare change in terms of the utility function.— 12a—
Again making use of equation (5) and the first-order condition, and





Ru2(dC'+ dC2/R) Ru2(dY' + dY2/R +c
dR)
=
u2(RdY' + dY2 + F'dR)
Thus one can write
2
(11) dU/u1 =(H'-N')dll'+H2 -N2
d112 + dR + fl'dH' +dH
As one would expect, the welfare indicator depends on the respective raw-
material price changes weighted by the self-sufficiency measurefor each
period. The third term in (11) stands for the welfare effect of a change
in the interest rate (i.e., the rate of intertemporal substitution). A
net debtor gains while a net creditor loses from a fall in R (and
conversely for an increase in R).
This finding suggests an interesting application to the effect of
the oil price shock on a net importer who also happens to be a net debtor
in the world capital market, the situation of a large number of LDCs. It
may very well be that after the first oil shock, the welfare gain from
the fall in the real interest rate could in some ofthese countries have
compensated for or even outweighed the direct loss due to the rise in real
oil prices. We return to this topic below.
It is a straightforward extension of the model to assume that at the
beginning of period 1 there is a net asset endowment B° (negative for
net debt). We ilow have B° + F1 =-F2/Rand therefore total assets
(B° + F') must replace F' in equation (11).- 13-
II.DETERMINATION OF THE REAL INTEREST RATEINA MULTI-COUNTRY MODEL
The model will now be extended to a world with many countries; each of
them has the same basic technology as the single economy described in the
preceding section, but different initial factor endowments are allowed.
We preserve the simplicity of a single final tradable good and an exogenous
relative price, 11n' confronting all countries. However, one country
(the OPEC country, subscript 0), which is a net exporter of the material
input, is singled out, while all other countries (1 =1,2, ..., m)are
net importers. The output of the raw material by all other countries is
t -t
assumed exogenously fixed (H =H)while that of country 0 will be
endogenously determined by world demand given the fixed relative price,
t
which isassumedto be set by country 0. We thus have:
(12) H - >0, 1-Ii -N
<0, Z(H -N)=0
where t =1,2;i =1,2, ..., m.
In aggregating real income over all countries, using the world balance
equation (12) for the material, we find that world income (Y) equals
world production of final goods (Q) and the world-market balance of
final goods can be written as
(13)
m
where C =EC., etc.
1=0
While the exogeneity of the real price of oil is kept for simplicity
(see further comment in Section V), the real rate of interest now becomes
endogenous. It will be assumed that R is determined by the world
equilibrium of savings supply and investment demand in the first period.- 14-
Themain object of this section is thus to consider the factors determining
the world savings and investment schedules. Consider first aggregate
investment demand which is obtained by aggregating the investment function
of the individual countries (we continue to ignore investment in the
production of H). Assuming constant returns to scale and summing 11( )
from(7) over countries, world investment can be written as
m
(14) = 1.1 = K2(112R) L2-K'
w .i n' ww'
i=a
where L2 is second period's world labour input (in intensity units) into
final goods production.
Figure 1 (below) shows the world investment schedule as a downward sloping
curve in R]space. An increase in the expected cost of oil or in
the capital stock will shift the I curve down and to the left.
The world savings schedule raises more ambiguities. Consider aggregate
savings as the difference between world income and consumption. Assume
first that labour markets clear. Then
S1 =Q,(ll')
-C{It',fl2, H(ll), H2(ll), R] -
(15)
S'(ll', 112,R) wnn
From the earlier analysis we know that gross output in each country
in the first period depends only on the first-period relative price and on
the given quantities of labour and capital (here omitted). Private
consumption in each country depends on R and on wealth which in turn
varies with the various relative prices. We have also inserted to
express the indirect dependence of OPEC consumption on its own price






iswhere the aggregation ambiguities come in, so it will be discussed in
greater detail.
Consider first the aggregate response Of C (and of S,) to changes
in the rate of interest. Aggregating (10) over countries, we can write
(16) =-BC/Ruz1/Ai +
The first term on the right-hand side of (16) is positive, as in the
single-country case. For the second term we know that the aggregate current
m
account balance for the whole world must be zero(Z F=0).The second
1=0
summation is the world aggregate propensity to consume out of wealth. Let
us divide the countries into net debtors (F <0)and net creditors
(F >0).A simple proposition follows:
World savings will be positively related to the rate of interest ifthe
deficit-weightedmarginal propensity to consume of thenet debtors is
greaterthcm (or equal to) thc surplus-weighted marginal propensity to
consumeof the netcreditors.
__..__11 -:-, _-__ 1 __ ——. 11-4- ÷h 11ILpiLiLdi iy uiie L IflIJJ. ..u
incomecountries for which one would assume that MPCs tend to be higher
than in countries with higher levels of income. It thus makes sense to
assumethat the world savings schedule is upward sloping (or flat)
The dependence on input price changes is more problematic. Consider




The second term in (17) is the negative real income effect on OPEC
consumption coming from the fall in demand for as fl is raised.
For the first term we apply an argument very similar to the one underlying- 17—




-N.Thus, -C/ll > 0 if <
l/(H -
-Hi).
Thus we have the proposition:
Aggregate world consumption falls with an increase in the real price of
oilif the marginal propensity to consume of the retoilecporter(s) is
less than the weighted marginal propensity to consume of the net importers.
Whilethe condition may have held immediately after the oil price
shock of 1973-74, it can at best be assumed to have been temporary, as
OPEC countries may have taken time to adjust consumption (the absence of
infrastructure may have held up imports, etc.). Even if it holds, however,
there is another force working in the opposite direction, that is, current
oil prices reduce real income and output (Q). A temporary price
increase may thus move savings either way. This argument does not hold
for an anticipated price increase (II) which will affect C but not
Q'.
Now consider a permanent increase in price (dUn =dIt
=dI[).Suppose
N = - N1(t =1,2) .Repeatingthe derivation of (17) for II,
m
and using the fact that C1/T[1 = (H.-N.)+ II'BH'/fl1 and w n . 1 1 n on
1=0





Thefirst term in (17') will be positive (or zero) if Ct/10 >
(for OPEC) and ? for all oil importers (i =
Thesecond term in (17') represents net savings of OPEC from the real
income effect of a change in 1I in both periods; it will be positive if
the fall in the demand for H is sufficiently smaller than the fall in
the demand for H'(note that the demand for the material will contract
0
in period 1 because the reduced capital input bears part of the adjustment
to higher material prices in that period).
So far we have assumed full wage flexibility in face of an oil
shock. To the extent that real wages are sticky in at least some oil
importing countries, Q,nowdependent on real wages in different
countries, will fall by more, with a further depressing effect on aggregate
savings.
The analysis has been conducted all along under the assumption that
producers always operate on their supply schedule and equate prices to
marginal costs. There is good reason to suggest that the contractionary
policies pursued by the major industrial countries after the first oil
shock (1975-76) and again in 1980-81 have temporarily placed some of them
in a short-term Keynesian disequilibrium (excess supply) situation. The
detailed analysis of savings and investment determination in a demand-
constrained situation will not be given here (for additional discussion
see Bruno and Sachs, 1979). For the present purpose suffice it to state
that contractionary demand policies in response to an input price shock
may further reduce aggregate savings along with aggregate output.8
Figure 1 depicts one case in which the savings schedule shifts to the
8 A fall in G will increasesavings but the resulting contraction in Q
maymore than offset it.- 19-
leftand there is also a substantial shift in the investment schedule.
Equilibrium moves from A to At and there is a drop in R from R°to
R' (in the case shown here both S and I also fall). When the
temporary effect on S wears off and the S curve shifts back R will
gradually increase. This may correspond to the developments in the world
capital market in the years immediately after the first oil crisis.
The alternative case depicted in Figure 1 is one in which the output-
depressing effect dominates and S shifts to the right (to S't). Suppose
the investment schedule shifts to the left by less (to I") after an oil
shock. This might correspond to the case in which an oil price increase
is perceived to be temporary or when there are other long-run expansionary
effects on I. A movement from A to A't will involve an increase in
R after an oil shock rather than a decrease.
These possibilities can be summarized in analytical form. For a




BR w w . w w
(19) = - — +
n n n
The numerator in (19) is positive while the denominator is positive
or negative according as BS/Bll (_BIw/Bfln) >0.Thus R will be
expected to fall whenever world savings shift up with fl or S shifts
down by less than I. However, for R to rise in the wake of an oil
price increase SW must shift down by more than
The partial derivative B5/Bll should be interpreted as comprising
the effects of both aggregate supply and aggregate demand shifts.- 20-
Thetwo cases just described may be relevant for an explanation of
the differences in real-interest behaviour after the two oil shocks. As
is well-known, one of the concomitants of the first supply shock (1973-74)
was a sharp reduction in real interest rates in the financial markets of
most industrial countries. Very small or negative rates were recorded
throughout 1974-77. As noted by Sachs (1981) and others, this drop can
mainly be attributed to the sharp fall in investments in the industrial
countries that followed the profit squeeze. While savings also contracted
substantially during 1974-75 in the industrial countries, it seems that
the temporary increase in OPEC savings more than compensated for the fall in
IC savings, so that the representation of the movement from point A to
A' in Figure 1 seems pertinent. The combined surplus of OPEC countries
and the ICs was matched by a rising deficit in the oil-importing countries,
financed to an increasing degree by private commercial loans which, in
turn, were funded by the recycling of petrodollars. Between 1972 and 1978
the flow of nonconcessional finance to LDCs more than quadrupled, from $13
billion to $56.1 billion at current prices. By 1978 this formed over 50
percent of total external finance in the oil-importing and over 60 percent
in the oil-exporting MICs (see World Bank, 1981, p. 53, Figure 5.3). All
of this increase was obtained at zero or negative real interest rates.
The OPEC surplus fell substantially between 1974 and 1978, before the
next oil shock set in. On the eve of the second shock (1978), the real
interest rates and relative current-account positions of the various country
groups were of roughly the same order of magnitude as in 1973. Yet the
second shock seems to have been followed by quite different developments
in the world capital market. By 1980 real rates had in most markets
reached high positive values above their pre-1973 levels, the United States- 21—
beinga temporary exception.1° A glance at relative current account
developments may suggest part of the answer. This timeround the ICs
were running large and persistent deficits (unlike with thefirst oil
shock, when their combined deficit was small and quickly disappeared)and
so were the oil exporting MICs (which in 1974 were running surpluses).
While a full answer to the question must await more detailed analysis
one may at least speculate that there has been a change in post-shock
investment behaviour. Figure 2 compares the combined quarterly investment
and savings developments of the three large industrial countries (United
States, Japan, and Germany) before and after the two oil shocks. The most
marked difference between the top and bottom parts of the figure seems to
lie in the much more moderate fall in investment immediately after the
shock and a very slight downward movement later on. While the three
countries represent only close to half the IC group, and the figures
represent ex-post rather than ex—cznte movements, they may be indicative
of the aggregate shifts. It is highly likely that the aggregate world
investment schedule (see Figure 1) shifted down by much less this time,
with the savings schedule possibly shifting down by more, especially with
the sharp 1980-81 contraction in the major industrial countries (and a
higher marginal propensity to consume in OPEC).
It is an open question, and one that is not directly relevant to our
present discussion, why investments have responded more moderately after
the second shock. The fall in investments after 1973 may in part have
10 E.g., the 90-day bill rate for the United States implied negative real
rates between the second quarter of 1979 and the third quarter of 1980
(this was not so in Germany and Japan). Only then did the U.S. real
rate rise to positive levels.- 22-
Figure2. Savings and Investment Under TwoOilShocks--United




Source: OECD, QuarterlyNational Accounts Statistics.
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beencompensation for an excessive earlier boom. The profit squeeze may
have been smaller this time, owing to a more moderate rise inoil and raw-
material prices or a more flexible downward real wage adjustment.Another
reason could be perception of the second shock as a temporary(in terms of
our previous analysis the eec—ante rise in rt mayhave been perceived as
less than that of TI'). Also, investment in energy-replacing equipment
may have become a more important factorthan in 1974.
III.THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE OF ICs AND MICs
Wecan now go back to consider some additional aspectsof the differential
response of individual countries tothe combination of a raw-material
price shock and the concomitant change in realinterest rates. We shall
confine ourselves here to the aftermath of the first oil and raw-material
price shock. It is too early to say anythingdefinite about the more
recent developments, and even the earlier episode still needs tobe
analysed in greater detail than can be done here.
The question to which we now return is how to account for the
different responses of the ICs and the MIC5 to a similar exogenousshock.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible and also stay within the
framework discussed earlier, let us assume that production in both types
of country uses the same technology in terms of the basic production
function Q =Q(L,K, N), but that they might differ in the (intensity
units) x (employment) decomposition of the labour input (L)and in its
rate of growth. An IC (subscript a) would initially have more intensity
units represented by each employed person than a MIC (subscript m),
while the time rate of change of total Lm supplied exogenouslywould- 24-
behigher than that of La on account of faster population growth and
faster labour-augmenting technical progress (being further away from the
technology frontier).
As long as we confine ourselves to the measurement of labour in
intensity units, the factor-price frontier for both types of country will
be the same. The curve q in [R, W] space (see Figure 3) is drawn for
a given initial relative price of the raw material Suppose the
IC is initially producing at the point Aa on the FPF, being in
equilibrium at the real rate of interest (= rate of return on capital),
R°, and paying a real wage per (intensity) unit of labour. The
slope of the tangent TS to the FPF at the point Aa measures the
capital-labour ratio (Ka/La = Ka) and the intercept OT measures
real income per unit of labour (Ya/La) For simplicitly assume that
the initial rate of return to capital in the IC is also the world rate of
interest on borrowing. It is also realistically assumed that a MIC
initially operates with a rate of return to capital above R°, either
because it does not have free access to the relevant private capital
market or because its domestic capital market is segmented and there is
a high risk premium. The MIC thus produces at the point Am with rate
of return R > R°, real wage W < W°, capital-labour ratio K /L < m m mm
K /L ,andreal income per unit of labour Y IL < Y IL •12 a a mm a a
Consider now a permanent shock to the relative price, 11n• This
The use of the factor-price frontier for both theory and empirical
estimation is discussed in greater detail in Bruno (l981a).
12 This could be represented by a tangent to FPF at Am with slope and
W intercept less than those of TS. Note that per employed person
(instead of units of labour) the initial difference in K/L and Y/L
between ICs and MICs would be much larger.- 25 -








willshow as an inward contraction of the FPF from to ',likethe
effect of technical regress. The way in which the FPF contracts depends
on the general specification of the production function. As long as one
considers a general increase in raw-material prices, the assumption of
weak separability is probably empirically valid and it is made here,13
i.e., it is assumed that Q =Q[N;V(K, L)]. In this case the FPF shifts
inward homothetically and the tangent at Ca on the new FPF would be
parallel to IS. In other words, Ca represents the new short-run, full-
employment, full-capacity equilibrium point for the IC, and Cm fulfils
the same role for the MIC.
The immediate response of the two economies to the same exogenous
price shock is probably different. Consider the extreme case in which
real wages are rigid in the IC and fully flexible in the MIC. In that
case the IC moves from Aa to B, there is a sharp profit squeeze (with
quasi-rents falling from R° to Rh), and unemployment emerges (at B
the capital-labour ratio is higher than at Aa)•' In the MIC, on the
other hand, the movement is from Am to Cm as real wages adjust
downward and employment need not fall (partial empirical evidence is
discussed below).
One can also tell a short-run story about differential demand
management in the two types of country. A contractionary fiscal or
monetary policy may push the IC further away from $' and cause an even
If one considers only the oil input, it might be more valid to assume
something closer to fixed proportions between N and K.In that case
'wouldbe parallel to .Seediscussion in Bruno (l98la).
1'. This would not beso under the alternative assumption, when FPF moves
to a position parallel to the original one.- 27—
tighterprofit squeeze.'5 This undoubtedly characterized most ICs after
1973 but did not happen in the typical MIC. As will be shown below, the
latter pursued expansionary policies and were willing and able to incur
higher current-account deficits and higher rates of inflation, an option
not pursued by the major industrial countries. In any case, even if real
wages were temporarily rigid in many ICs, unemployment helped to reduce
real wages with varying lags. In terms of Figure 3 the implication of IC
short-run adjustment is a gradual movement along q' from B towards Ca•
The long-run behaviour depends, as we have seen, on what happens to
the real rate of interest. Suppose it falls from R° to Rt. In that case
a new long-run equilibrium for the ICwould be at the point E, at which
the capital-labour ratio is lower than at Ca (or Aa)• In our simplified
two-period model this move will take place in one period. In a more
realistic model it will be a gradual development. One would thus observe
a slowdown in capital accumulation (Ka/La falls but since La goes on
rising, Ka need not fall but investment will). Note that the new long-
run equilibrium need not lie to the right of Ca but could be at a point
such as F, if R'falls enough. In the latter case real wages (relative
to productivity trend) might first fall in response to unemployment and
then rise again as the capital-labour ratio adjusts upwards. This is less
likely to have actually happened, especially since the sharp fall in real
interest rates did not last very long.
'Formally,the argument is that firms will no longer be on their supply
curves. The curve 'remainsthe relevant frontier for the marginal
product of labour and capital but not for actual rates of return. In
such a disequilibrium situation prices are above marginal costs, so
that the actual FPF would be shifted further inwards, homothetically,
as is illustrated by, say, the curve— 28—
Thelong- or medium-run story may again be different forthe MICs.
The rate of return at Cis higher than the newly established rate of
interest, R', and the extended private capital market has now become
fully accessible to MICs. There is an incentive to borrow, invest,and
increase the capital-labour ratio towards its long-run level at E. The
movement along the FPF is from Cm to E. In the process the real wage
may or may not rise above its original level Wm (itwill obviously
rise per employed pereon).
The analysis is thus consistent with a marked difference in the
effect of the same exogenous shocks on the two groups of countries.'6
Clearly there was also a third group of countries. A net importing
country that does not have access to the capital market or thatdoes not
have the industry base to which the private loans could be channeled would
obviously not enjoy the full benefits of recycling and would suffer the
terms-of-trade loss due to rising oil and raw-material prices. This
probably happened in most of the lower income LDCs in the 1970s. However,
quite a few of the MICs may have benefitted, at least temporarily, from
the combination of events after the first oil shock.17
16 If, as is likely, for the aggregate economy the shock itself was
smaller for a MIC than for an IC (see next section), the relevant FPF
a fortiori shifts inwards by less, adding another component to the
difference in response between countries.
'Thisdoes not seem to have happened after the second shock. An
increasing number of MICs ran into trouble at the end of the 1970s
(e.g., Korea, Brazil, Mexico). This is probably not unconnected with
the sharply rising cost of foreign borrowing and the rising real cost
of labour.IV. COMPARATIVE EMPIRrCAL EVIDENCE
Thedifference in aggregate performance of the two types of country in
the 1970s will first be illustrated by an international comparison of 38
countries, 19 OECD countries and 19 MICs. While the OECD group covers
almost all the industrial market economies,
two thirds, in terms of population, of the
importers (as defined in World Development
employment data could be found for only 10
cent of the population of all MICs. Table
for both subgroups of MICs.'8
Note the group differences in average
pre-1973 (period I, 1960-73) and post-1973
growth of both GDP and GDP per employed person slowed down sharply in the
OECD group. The MICs hardly slowed down in terms of total GDP growth and
they may on average have improved their labour-productivity performance.
Growth was by no means even during the subperiod in either group of
countries. Table 3 gives more detail for a subsample of countries.
Immediately after the first shock (1973-75) the difference between the
groups was even sharper, with only partial recovery for OECD countries in
1975-78, while most MICs represented here grew faster during the period.
The second shock (1978-80) was followed by a slump in both groups, again
more pronounced in OECD countries. All countries seem to show a close
relationship between GDP growth and labour-productivity growth, a point
to which we shall return later.
18 Below (Table 5) we also give data of manufacturing employment for a
group of 17 MICs.
- 29-
the MICs comprise only about
class of middle-income oil
Report 1981). Aggregate
of these, comprising 43 per-
2 accordingly gives averages
growth performance, comparing
(period II, 1973-80). The- 30-
Table2. AnnualAverage Rate of Change of SelectedVariable8,"
by CountryGroup: 1960-73 and1973-80k'
19 OECDcountries'10 MICs' 19 MICs'
1960-731973-801960-731973-801960-731973-80
1.Gross domestic
product 4.71.8 2.62.2 6.7
&.9 6.03.8 6.63.6 6.33.4
2.Employment 1.2 0.7 4.0 2.9 - -
3..GDP per employed
person 3.6 2.0 2.7 3.0 - -
4.Gross investment 6.4 0.4 8.9 6.6 9.7 8].
5.Public consumption4.8 2.3 9.9 6.6 8.4 7.7
6.Import/export


























Small numerals are mean standard deviation.
Line 8, 1965-73 for first period, 1973-79 for some MIC countries in
second period.
Comprising all OECD countries with the exclusion of Greece, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey.
See list in Table 3.
As above, with the addition of: Ivory Coast, Morocco, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Brazil, and Colombia.
Source: Line 1. For OECD: Divisia index based on OECD accounts.
Lines 4 through 6, 8: OECD, National Income A.'counte, and
IBRD World Tables (for LDC).
Line 7: IMF, International Financial Stcztietics.- 31-
Tü.ble3. Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product
Product per Employed Person (Q/L)., in
andTenMICs: 1966-80
(Q) andGrossDomestic
Nine Major OECD Countries
(annual average rate of change, percent)
Ten smaller countries not shown here are: Australia, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland.
Asterisk denotes the subsample of six countries for which all observa-
tions are available.
1966-73 1973-75 1975-78 1978—80
Q Q/L Q Q/L Q Q/L Q Q/L
Nine major OECDcountries-'
United States 3.4 1.3-0.8-1.05.11.41.3-0.2
United Kingdom 3.33.4-0.8-0.92.72.8-0.00.5
Belgium 5.24.4 1.2 1.23.23.52.41.9









Kenya 6.9 2.7 5.2 1.4 7.6 3.8 2.5 -
Mauritius* 3.7-0.94.80.19.54.6-1.4-0.9
Korea* 10.1 6.4 8.2 5.011.7 7.0 1.7 0.9
Philippines 5.6 - 6.0 3.3 6.6 - 5.9 —
Singapore* 12.9 - 5.2 3.1 8.0 3.1 9.8 3.8
Yugoslavia* 5.7 2.9 7.6 2.2 7.4 3.1 4.0 0.3
Syria 6.4-25.320.24.71.27.1 -
Zambia* 3.2-0.32.1-0.60.52.8-3.0-5.2
Egypt 3.1 1.15.73.010.3 - 6.9 -
Israel* 9.66.14.23.32.2-0.71.6-0.2
Mean 6.7 — 7.4 — 6.9 — 3.5 —
Mean* 7.52.45.42.26.63.32.1-0.2- 32—
Comingback to Table 2, note the important related intergroup difference
in the variability of output growth. For the OECD countries the mean
standard deviation of annual growth rose from fast growth (period I) to
slow growth (period II). For the MICs the opposite was true. The coef-
ficient of variation rose from less than 0.5 in OECD to 0.8 after 1973,
while for the nineteen MICs it fell from 0.7 to 0.6. This difference is in
turn related to differential demand management (the data for growth in public
consumption and gross investment in the samples are also given in Table 2).
The terms of trade on average deteriorated in the OECD group (relative
import/export prices fell by an average of 0.5 percent in period I and rose
by 1.5 percent in period II), while they hardly changed for the MICs (slight
deterioration for the entire group of 19, slight improvement for the sub-
sample).1 9 This differenceprobably stems from exports of primary commodi-
ties which were (and still are) sizeable in most MICs.
The trade-off for the more expansionary stance of the MICs is
indicated in the lower part of Table 2. The acceleration of inflation
was greater (and the coefficient of variation was higher). A more
pronounced difference, which brings us back to the main topic of this
paper, is the sizeable increase in the relative foreign-resource gap of
the MICs shown by the rise in the real current-account deficit relative
to GDP (with more or less constant average variability), while the OECD
on average reduced an already small resource gap.20
19 There isreason to think that the average difference in the magnitude
of the input price shock was similar for manufacturing in the two groups
but we have no data for the MICs.
20 There was some difference between large and small industrial countries,
the smaller tending to borrow more. For the 9 major OECD countries the
change in percentage gap was from 0.5 (±1.0) to -0.4 (±1.3); for the
remaining, smaller 10 the change was from 2.3 (±1.9) to 2.0 (±2.7).- 33-
Regressionof the difference in labour productivity growth between
the two periods, 60-73 and 73-80 [A(r - onthe difference in terms-
of-trade change [L( -)Jandin the growth of public expenditures
(i) gives the following equation, based on 29 country observations,
(i) t('' - =-0.460 -O.309A(- +O.l33A (R2 = 0.22)
0•'+67 0.136 0.080
where small numerals are standard errors. The ten smaller MICs on average
show a positive deviation of 1.25 percentage points from this regression
(and the nineteen OECD countries, a negative deviation of 0.66, on
average). This could be accounted for by the differential growth in the
capital-labour ratio, a variable missing from the regression owing to lack
of data. The importance of demand management and of differential output
variability can alternatively be seen in the cross-section regression (for
thesame 29 countries) of employment increments or input price -
ontotal demand acceleration () and the change in output variability
(ii) =0.065-0.O58AQ- +O.223+
0,'+13 0.061 0.091 0.211
(R2=0.26).
Thefact that the coefficient of output is substantially less than unity
indicates the positive relationship between output and labour productivity
growth (the implied elasticity of 0.78 seems too high —seebelow). This
coefficient is hardly affected by the introduction of the variability
measure, which turns out to be quite important in its own right. This result
makes sense. On theoretical grounds, one would expect average employment- 34-
requirements(for given output growth) to rise (and productivity to fall)
as output (demand) becomes more uncertain, thus bearing outthe importance
of sustained expansion for productivity growth.
When one breaks up the sample into its OECD and MIC components, the
following two improved regressions are obtained
(iii) (19 UECD) A =-0.906+ 0.300A( -%)+ 0.524M + 0.7O8Aa
0.707 0.079m 0169 0.336 V
(2 =054)
(iv) (10 MICS)M.= -0.362 -0.l47t(f
-f ) +0.325AI + O.275A
0.7L.5 0•086m C 0151 0.369 V
(r(= 0.39).
Note the fact that output variability played an important role for OECD
and was of no significance for the MICs and that the demand variable is
higher in the first regression. Finally, we note that the positive
coefficient for the relative input to wage cost in the first equation
while there is a negative response to the real input price in the second
equation are both consistent with a conjecture that the OECD countries
were closer to being demand-constrained while the MIC's may have been closer
to being supply-constrained. The latter point is strengthened when we
widen the MIC sample but narrows our view to the manufacturing sector
across countries. Table 4 gives a set of figures for 17 MICs, again
compared with the 19 OECD countries. This suggests that there was a
slowdown in both output and labour productivity for the manufacturing
sector also in the MICs.21 The relative increase in the MICs' share of
21 The variabilityamong MICs was quite large, however, for both output
and output per employed person.- 35-
Table4. Annual Average Rate of Change, Selected Variables in Manufacturing,
by Country Group: 1960(66)—73, 1973—79
19 OECDcountries 17MICs
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List of 10 countries as in Table 3 with the addition of: Hong Kong,
Chile, India, Greece, Venezuela, Mexico and Peru.
Nominal wage rate in manufacturing deflated by consumer price index.
Excluding Chile.
Source: Output: IMF (IFS) and IBRD (World Tables)
Employment: ILO Bulletin
Real wage: Nominal wage (IMF and ILO) divided by consumer prices
(IMF)- 36-
worldmanufacturing output, mentioned at the beginning of the paper (see
Table 1) was thus primarily due to sizeable employment growth in this
sector, which on average continued unabated at a rate of 5.4 percent (see
Table 4, line 2).
The fact that labour productivity fell in the manufacturing sector
for both types of countries is consistent with the overall rise in real
oil and raw-material prices which has afflicted this sector more than the
aggregate economy (no data exist for the MICs). Next we note that in the
period preceding 1973 real wages in the MICs grew much more slowly than
labour productivity, providing support to the argument that by 1973 profits
in the MICs may have been relatively high. Next, Table 5 provides some
evidence to our claim that real wages in 1973-75 were on average downward
flexible in the MICs, much less so in the major OECD countries, and not at
all in the smaller OECD countries.22 This was most probably reversed in
the subsequent upswing in 1975-78 when an increasing number of MICs
encountered rising real labour costs.
A regression of the change in manufacturing employment growth for the
17 MICs between 1966-73 and 1973-79 on real import prices -
realwages A(' -i,), andtotal aggregate uses (Aa) yields the following
significant results:
(v) L2,= 1.503-0.l9OA(1!
-) - 0.l3OA(-5)+ 0.7l6Ad
0.861 0.031m c C 0.167
(R2 =0.62).
Obviously capital stock growth is missing from this regression and it may be
22 Ofcourse, there are always exceptions (e.g., Austria and Finland).- 37-
Table5. Average Real Wage Growth in Manufacturing by Sub-Period and
Country Group
1966—73 1973-751975-781978-81
7major OECD 4.8 3.4 3.2 1.6w
12small OECD 4.4 5.3 1.7 0.7
15MICs' 0.9 -1.7 - -
12MICs' - -1.4 4.4 -
Excluding U.S.
Group of 17 excluding Hong Kong, Kenya
Group of 17 excluding Hong Kong, Syria, Zambia, Egypt,
Chile
Source:Nominalwage (IMP and ILO) divided by consumer prices (IMF).— 38-
proxiedby the significant positive intercept and possibly also by the
total expenditure variable (Aa)
Finally,we turn back to the current account. The trade-off between
demand or output growth and the current account is borne out by a
regression(based on the full sample of 38 countries represented in Table 2)
of the change in relative resource gap [A(-F/V)} on the change in import-
weighted (with weight y) terms-of-trade [A(Pm -f)y] andin the growth




Theterms-of-trade factor represents the substitution between domestic
and foreign goods while the other two variables may be thought of as
representing shifts in aggregate saving and investment. The relative
deficits of the nineteen MICs deviate by an average of 0.6 from this
regression (-0.6 for the OECD countries). An alternative view which would
lead to similar results is represented by the pair of regressions
(vii) t(-F/V) =3.98-2.27(f-)y+l.27A'r (2 =0.51) 0.92 0.70m X 0.38
(viii) 't' =-0.44+0.l3+0.24k (f2= 0.79). 0.19 0.0k 0.03
Here the interpretation of the model would be in terms of a direct
trade-off between current-account and GDP growth derived from the import-
requirement side, with GDP growth in turn generated by the two aggregate-
demand components, g and k. When one substitutes from regression (viii)- 39-
into(vii), the resulting equation resembles (vi), except for a smaller
coefficient of public consumption.23 The model underlying (vi) is consistent
with an ex—ante investment-savings-gap view while that of (vii)-(viii) is
consistent with an ex—ante import-gap viewof the current account. In the
aggregate and for the period averages it is difficult to distinguish between
the two. When the data are broken down into the two country groups, there
is some indication that a model such as (vii)-(viii) may have worked better
for the industrial countries.2' A more detailed investigation would be
required to substantiate this statement, but here1 as in the case of
employment, it does at least make sense to conjecture that the industrial
countries were on average and by choice more demand-constrained while the
MICs were on average more supply-constrained in their balance of payments
behaviour during much of the post-1973 period. Whichever is the more
accurate view of the role of foreign borrowing, there seems little doubt
that there was a pronounced trade-off between aggregate productivity and
the current account, both short-run and long-run, which the MICs actively
used to their advantage in the period between the two oil shocks. There
are also clear indications that this 'free-ride' was over by 1979-80 as
the real costs of foreign borrowing as well as the real costs of domestic
labour were rising substantially.
23 When t or 1k are added into regression (vii) as separate variables,
a positive but not very significant role is indicated for t but
none for Ak.
2+ Model (vi) does not seem to yield anything, while the other model,
(vii)-(viii), yields some, though not highly significant, results.- 40-
V.CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis of capital market equilibrium and the differential impact of external
shocks, as discussed here, leaves some incomplete answers and several open
questions. On the level of economic theory, the single-good model, although
simple and transparent, is also too simple to take account of some important
aspects of the world adjustment problem. Since no change in final-goods
terms of trade are allowed there is no room for expenditure-switching
effects and for real exchange-rate adjustments, which were of considerable
importance in the 1970s. It also does not enable one to put the proper
emphasis on the role of internal demand-management policies of different
countries in the determination of world equilibrium. A step in this
direction has been taken in a recent three-country model by Marion and
Svensson (1981), in which the final-goods terms of trade are allowed to
change. A simpler, though less ambitious, alternative would be to extend
the present model by adding a domestic nontradable-goods industry in each
country.25
Another set of issues raised by the world equilibrium analysis is the
interplay of OPEC oil pricing, IC response and interest rate effects. We
have taken the simplistic view that the real price of oil is fixed
exogenously and that OPEC adjusts its output accordingly. The two-period
model leaves open the question of oil depletion, or what happens to oil
The single-economy, two-good, two-period model is worked out in Bruno
(1981b). If one keeps the assumption that capital goods are fully
traded, the determination of the world interest rate would retain the
single-sector simplicity, while the introduction of the nontradable
good allows for domestic changes in sectoral allocation and an explicit
role for domestic demand management.- 41-
thatis left over at the end of the second period (here it is valueless).
Next, while we believe that OPEC has had some command over the
real price of oil its nominal price has certainly not been indexed on a
continuous basis. Part of the adjustment problem has had to do with the
ratchet effects of increases followed by decreases in relative oil prices.
There is also the interesting strategic question of how OPEC's pricing
behaviour is affected by the experience of the resulting change in real
interest rates, an externality which in turn affects the rate of return
on its own assets (there is always the alternative of leaving oil in the
ground). There is a similar externality problem for the ICs whose
contractionary policies have indirectly enabled the MICs to expand at the
ICs' expense. Some of these interesting game-theoretic questions have
been raised in a recent paper by Dixit (1981).
Finally, there is need to study in greater detail the actual recent
experience of the MICs, particularly in the area of real-wage and
profitability behaviour. A more detailed comparison of the experience of
a number of these countries with that of the industrial countries would
no doubt throw much more light on the questions discussed here and probably
raise some new ones.- 42-
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